ROGERS
v. KOONS, 960
F.2d 301 (2nd Cir. 1992)
ART
ROGERS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE-CROSS-APPELLANT, v. JEFF KOONS; SONNABEND
GALLERY,
INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS-CROSS-APPELLEES.
Nos.
234, 388 and 235, Dockets 91-7396, 91-7442 and 91-7540.
United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued
October 3, 1991.
Decided
April 2, 1992.
Appeal from
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of
New York.
[EDITORS'
NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINED HEADNOTES AND HEADNOTES
ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL
PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT
DISPLAYED.]
John B. Koegel,
New York City (Frank H. Wright, Michael D.
Rips, Cathy
Wright Isaacson, Wright Manning Rips & Maloney,
of counsel),
for defendants-appellants Jeff Koons and Sonnabend
Gallery, Inc.
L. Donald
Prutzman, New York City (Andre R. Jaglom, Stecher
Jaglom &
Prutzman, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee
Art Rogers.
Gregory F.
Hauser, New York City (Walter, Conston, Alexander
& Green,
P.C., New York City, Louis A. Colombo, John
D. Parker, Michael
K. Farrell, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland,
Ohio, of counsel),
filed a brief on behalf of United Feature Syndicate,
Inc. as amicus
curiae.
Before: CARDAMONE,
PIERCE and WALKER, Circuit Judges.
CARDAMONE,
Circuit Judge:
[1] The key
to this copyright infringement suit, brought
by a plaintiff
photographer against a defendant sculptor and
the gallery
representing him, is defendants' borrowing of
plaintiff's expression
of a typical American scene — a smiling
husband and wife
holding a litter of charming puppies. The copying
was so deliberate
as to suggest that defendants resolved so long
as they were
significant players in the art business, and
the copies they produced
bettered the price of the copied work by a thousand
to one,
their piracy of a less well-known artist's work
would escape being
sullied by an accusation of plagiarism.
[2] BACKGROUND
FACTS
[3] A. Rogers
[4] We think
it helpful to understanding this appeal to set
forth the
principals' professional backgrounds. Plaintiff,
Art Rogers, a
43-year-old professional artist-photographer,
has a studio and home
at Point Reyes, California, where he makes his
living by creating,
exhibiting, publishing and otherwise making
use of his rights
in his photographic works. Exhibitions of his
photographs have
been held in California and as far away as Maine,
Florida and
New York. His work has been described in French
("Le Monde"), British
("The Photo") and numerous American publications,
including
the Journal of American Photography, Polaroid's
Close-Up Magazine
and the Popular Photography Annual. Rogers'
photographs
are part of the permanent collection of the
San Francisco
Museum of Modern
Art, the Center for Creative Photography at
the University of
Arizona and Joseph E. Seagrams and Sons in New
York City. He has taught
photography at the San Francisco Museum of Modern
Art.
[5] B. Creating
The Photograph "Puppies"
[6] In 1980
an acquaintance, Jim Scanlon, commissioned Rogers
to photograph
his eight new German Shepherd puppies. When
Rogers went
to his home on September 21, 1980 he decided
that taking a picture
of the puppies alone would not work successfully,
and chose
instead to include Scanlon and his wife holding
them. Substantial
creative effort went into both the composition
and production
of "Puppies," a black and white photograph.
At the photo
session, and later in his lab, Rogers drew on
his years of artistic
development. He selected the light, the location,
the bench
on which the Scanlons are seated and the arrangement
of the small
dogs. He also made creative judgments concerning
technical matters
with his camera and the use of natural light.
He prepared a
set of "contact sheets," containing 50 different
images, from which
one was selected.
[7] After
the Scanlons purchased their prints for $200,
"Puppies" became
part of Rogers' catalogue of images available
for further use,
from which he, like many professional photographers,
makes his
living. "Puppies" has been used and exhibited
a number of times.
A signed print of it has been sold to a private
collector, and
in 1989 it was licensed for use in an anthology
called "Dog Days."
Rogers also planned to use the picture in a
series of hand-tinted
prints of his works. In 1984 Rogers had licensed
"Puppies",
along with other works, to Museum Graphics,
a company that
produces and sells notecards and postcards with
high quality reproductions
of photographs by well-respected American
photographers
including, for example, Ansel Adams. Museum
Graphics has
produced and distributed the "Puppies" notecard
since 1984.
The first printing was of 5,000 copies and there
has been
a second similar size printing.
[8] C. Koons
[9] Defendant
Jeff Koons is a 37-year-old artist and sculptor
residing in
New York City. After receiving a Bachelor of
Fine Arts
degree from Maryland Institute College of Art
in 1976, he worked
at a number of jobs, principally membership
development at the
Museum of Modern Art in New York. While pursuing
his career as
an artist, he also worked until 1984 as a mutual
funds salesman,
a registered commodities salesman and broker,
and a commodities
futures broker. In the ten years from 1980 to
1990 Koons
has exhibited his works in approximately 100
Group Exhibitions
and in eleven one-man shows. His bibliography
is extensive.
Koons is represented by Sonnabend Gallery, New
York, Donald
Young Gallery, Chicago, and Galerie Max Hetzler,
Cologne, Germany.
His works sell at very substantial prices, over
$100,000.
He is a controversial artist hailed by some
as a "modern
Michelangelo," while others find his art "truly
offensive."
A New York Times critic complained that "Koons
is pushing
the relationship between art and money so far
that everyone
involved comes out looking slightly absurd."
[10] D. Creating
the Sculpture "String of Puppies"
[11] After
a successful Sonnabend show in 1986, Koons began
creating a
group of 20 sculptures for a 1988 exhibition
at the same gallery
that he called the "Banality Show." He works
in an art tradition
dating back to the beginning of the twentieth
century. This
tradition defines its efforts as follows: when
the artist finishes
his work, the meaning of the original object
has been extracted
and an entirely new meaning set in its place.
An example
is Andy Warhol's reproduction of multiple images
of Campbell's
soup cans. Koons' most famous work in this genre
is a stainless
steel casting of an inflatable rabbit holding
a carrot. During
1986 and 1987 the sculptor traveled widely in
Europe looking
at materials and workshops where he might fabricate
materials
for the Banality Show. He decided to use porcelain,
mirrors and
wood as mediums. Certain European studios were
chosen to
execute his porcelain
works, other studios chosen for the mirror
pieces, and the small Demetz Studio, located
in the northern
hill country town of Ortessi, Italy, was selected
to carve
the wood sculptures.
[12] Koons
acknowledges that the source for "String of
Puppies" was a
Museum Graphics notecard of "Puppies" which
he purchased in a "very
commercial, tourist-like card shop" in 1987.
After buying the
card, he tore off that portion showing Rogers'
copyright of "Puppies."
Koons saw certain criteria in the notecard that
he thought
made it a workable source. He believed it to
be typical, commonplace
and familiar. The notecard was also similar
to other images
of people holding animals that Koons had collected.
Thus, he
viewed the picture as part of the mass culture
"resting in the
collective sub-consciousness of people regardless
of whether the
card had actually ever been seen by such people."
[13] Appellant
gave his artisans one of Rogers' notecards and
told them
to copy it. But in order to guide the creation
of a three-dimensional
sculptural piece from the two-dimensional
photograph,
Koons communicated extensively with the Demetz
Studio. He
visited it once a week during the period the
piece was being
carved by the workers and gave them written
instructions. In
his "production notes" Koons stressed that he
wanted "Puppies" copied
faithfully in the sculpture. For example, he
told his artisans
the "work
must be just like photo
— features of photo must
be captured;" later, "puppies
need detail in fur.
Details —
Just Like Photo!;"
other notes instruct the artisans to "keep
man
in angle of photo
— mild lean to side & mildly forward
— same
for woman," to "keep woman's big smile," and
to "keep [the sculpture]
very, very realistic;" others state, "Girl's
nose is too
small. Please make larger as per photo;"
another reminds the artisans
that "The puppies must have variation in fur
as
per photo
— not just large area of paint —
variation as
per photo."
(emphasis supplied).
[14] To paint
the polychromed wood "String of Puppies" sculptures,
Koons provided
a chart with an enlarged photocopy of "Puppies"
in the
center; painting directions were noted in the
margin with arrows
drawn to various areas of the photograph. The
chart noted, "Puppies,
painted in shades of blue. Variation of light-to-dark
as
per photo.
Paint realistic as
per photo,
but in blues." and
"Man's hair, white with shades of grey as
per black and white
photo!"
(emphasis supplied).
[15] When
it was finished, "String of Puppies" was displayed
at the Sonnabend
Gallery, which opened the Banality Show on November
19, 1988.
Three of the four copies made were sold to collectors
for a total
of $367,000; the fourth or artist's copy was
kept by Koons. Defendant
Koons' use of "Puppies" to create "String of
Puppies" was
not authorized by plaintiff. Rogers learned
of Koons' unauthorized
use of his work through Jim Scanlon, the man
who had commissioned
Rogers to create "Puppies." A friend of Scanlon's,
who was familiar
with the photograph, called to tell him that
what she took
to be a "colorized" version of "Puppies" was
on the front
page of the calendar section of the May 7, 1989
Sunday Los
Angeles
Times.
In fact, as she and Scanlon later learned, the
newspaper
actually depicted Koons' "String of Puppies"
in connection
with an article about its exhibition at the
Los Angeles
Museum of Contemporary Art.
[16] PRIOR
PROCEEDINGS
[17] Rogers
brought this action against Koons and Sonnabend
Gallery on
October 11, 1989, alleging copyright infringement
and unfair competition
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and under
state law. Both
sides advised the district court at an early
stage of the proceedings
that, at least as to copyright infringement,
disputed factual
issues were unlikely and disposition on summary
judgment would
probably be appropriate. After completion of
discovery, both
sides moved for that relief on July 5, 1990.
Rogers' motion was
limited to the copyright infringement claim.
Koons and the Sonnabend
Gallery sought summary judgment dismissing all
counts in
plaintiff's complaint.
[18] The district
court held oral argument on November 26, 1990.
In a
December 10, 1990 decision, described more fully
below, it found
that Koons copied "Puppies" in "String of Puppies"
and that this
copying was not a fair use. It therefore found
infringement, 751
F.Supp. 474. Rogers' motion for an infringing
profits award was
denied because the trial court believed there
were disputed questions
of fact concerning their computation. As to
Sonnabend Gallery,
the district court concluded on February 22,
1991 that the
record showed Sonnabend's as well as Koons'
liability for infringing
profits. On March 27, 1991 it entered a permanent
injunction
enjoining Koons and Sonnabend Gallery from making,
selling, lending
or displaying any copies of, or derivative works
based on,
"Puppies," and, pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 503,
requiring defendants
to deliver all infringing articles to plaintiff
within 20
days, including the fourth or artist's copy
of "String of Puppies."
[19] When
defendants failed to comply with the turn-over
order, Rogers
moved to hold defendant Koons in contempt. The
proceedings on
that motion revealed that nine days after the
injunction was issued,
Koons had loaned the fourth copy of "String
of Puppies" to
a museum in Germany and arranged for its shipment
out of the United
States. After a hearing on May 8, 1991 the district
court held
Koons in contempt, directed him to do whatever
was necessary to
effect the sculpture's return from Germany,
and imposed a daily
fine for continued non-compliance to commence
eight days later.
[20] On May
28, 1991 we denied Koons' motion to stay the
injunction and
the contempt penalty pending appeal, but delayed
the commencement
of the daily fine until June 7, 1991. From the
finding of
copyright infringement, the granting of a permanent
injunction,
and the turn-over order appellants Koons and
Sonnabend
appeal. Rogers cross-appeals from the denial
of an award
prior to trial for infringing profits. We affirm.
[21] DISCUSSION
[22] I Ownership
of Copyright in an Original Work of Art
[23] One of
the powers given Congress under Art. I, §
8 of the United
States Constitution is: "To promote the Progress
of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and
Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and
Discoveries." Madison noted that "[T]he utility
of this power will
scarcely be questioned." The Federalist No.
43 (Madison) at 279.
He further observed that copyright for authors
was their right
under common law. Id.;
see
2 Blackstone, Commentaries
on the
Laws of England
407 (Univ. of Chicago ed. 1979). As a
result, Congress
enacted a copyright law, 17 U.S.C. §
101 et
seq.
(1976), under which the instant litigation was
instituted.
[24] To establish
an infringement of a copyright, a plaintiff
must show
both ownership of a copyright and that defendant
copied the protected
material without authorization. See
Weissmann v. Freeman,
868 F.2d 1313,
1320 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied,
493 U.S. 883, 110
S.Ct. 219, 107 L.Ed.2d 172 (1989). The Copyright
Act makes
a certificate of registration from the U.S.
Register of Copyrights
prima
facie
evidence of the valid ownership of a
copyright,
see
17 U.S.C. § 410(c),
though that presumption of ownership
may be rebutted, see
Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys,
Inc.,
780 F.2d 189,
192 (2d Cir. 1985). Protection under
the copyright
statute extends to pictorial works, 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
For more than a century photographs have been
held to be
copyrightable "writings" under Article I, §
8 of the Constitution.
BurrowGiles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53,
4 S.Ct. 279,
28 L.Ed. 349 (1884) (photograph of Oscar Wilde
an original
work of art).
[25] Of the
several issues before us, the first concerns
the originality
of "Puppies." Defendants do not challenge plaintiff's
ownership
of a valid copyright, but assert instead that
the portion
of Rogers' work allegedly infringed was not
an original work
of authorship protected under the 1976
Copyright Act. Since the law protects authors'
exclusive rights to
their works, the cornerstone of that law is
that the work protected must
be original. See
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service
Co., Inc.,
___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1287, 113
L.Ed.2d 358
(1991). Thus, that a whole work is copyrighted
does not
mean that every element of it is copyrighted;
copyright protection
extends only to those components of the work
that are original
to the creator. Id.
111 S.Ct. at 1289. But the quantity
of originality that need be shown is modest
— only a dash
of it will do. Id.
at 1287; 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,
Nimmer
on Copyright
§ 1.08[C][1] (1991) (Nimmer).
[26] Elements
of originality in a photograph may include posing
the subjects,
lighting, angle, selection of film and camera,
evoking the
desired expression, and almost any other variant
involved. See
Burrow Giles,
111 U.S. at 60, 4 S.Ct. at 282. 1 Nimmer, §
2.08[E][1].
To the extent that these factors are involved,
"Puppies"
is the product of plaintiff's artistic creation.
Rogers' inventive
efforts in posing the group for the photograph,
taking the
picture, and printing "Puppies" suffices to
meet the original
work of art criteria. Thus, in terms of his
unique expression
of the subject matter captured in the photograph,
plaintiff
has established valid ownership of a copyright
in an original
work of art.
[27] II Unauthorized
Copying by Defendant
[28] Plaintiff
next must demonstrate that defendant Koons copied
his protected
work without authorization. The district court
granted summary
judgment to Rogers on this issue, finding Koons'
sculpture
"String of Puppies" an unauthorized copy of
Rogers' photograph.
Summary judgment may be an appropriate remedy
in copyright
infringement suits. See,
e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Dan River Mills, Inc.,
295 F.Supp. 1366, 1369 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
415 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1969). Yet, such relief
will be denied
when the question of substantial similarity
is one on which
reasonable minds could differ. See,
e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc.,
715 F.2d 1327,
1329 (9th Cir.
1983).
[29] Here,
the trial court found original elements of creative
expression
in the copyrighted work were copied and that
the copying
was so blatantly apparent as not to require
a trial. We agree
that no reasonable juror could find that copying
did not occur
in this case. First, this case presents the
rare scenario where
there is direct evidence of copying. Koons admittedly
gave a
copy of the photograph to the Italian artisans
with the explicit
instruction that the work be copied. Moreover,
the importance
of copying the very details of the photograph
that embodied
plaintiff's original contribution -the poses,
the shading,
the expressions- was stressed by Koons throughout
the creation
of the sculpture. His instructions invariably
implored that
the creation must be designed "as per photo."
This undisputed
direct evidence of copying is sufficient to
support the
district court's granting of summary judgment.
[30] Further,
even were such direct evidence of copying unavailable,
the district
court's decision could be upheld in this case
on the basis
that defendant Koons' access to the copyrighted
work is conceded,
and the accused work is so substantially similar
to the copyrighted
work that reasonable jurors could not differ
on this issue.
See
Warner Brothers, Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., Inc.,
654 F.2d 204,
207 (2d Cir. 1981).
[31] Substantial
similarity does not require literally identical
copying of
every detail. See
3 Nimmer, § 13.03[A]. See
also Comptone
Company Ltd. v. Rayex Corp.,
251 F.2d 487,
488 (2d Cir.
1958). Such similarity is determined by the
ordinary observer test:
the inquiry is "whether an average lay observer
would recognize
the alleged copy as having been appropriated
from the copyrighted
work." Ideal
Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd.,
360 F.2d 1021,
1022 (2d Cir.
1966). Or, stated another way, whether "the
ordinary observer,
unless he set out to detect the disparities,
would be disposed
to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as
the same." Peter
Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,
274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960).
Thus, Koons' allegation that a trial judge uneducated
in art is not
an appropriate decision-maker misses the mark;
the decision-maker, whether
it be a judge or a jury, need not have any special
skills other than
to be a reasonable and average lay person.
[32] We recognize
that ideas, concepts, and the like found in
the common
domain are the inheritance of everyone. What
is protected is
the original or unique way that an author expresses
those ideas,
concepts, principles or processes. Hence, in
looking at these
two works of art to determine whether they are
substantially
similar, focus must be on the similarity of
the expression
of an idea or fact, not on the similarity of
the facts,
ideas or concepts themselves. See
Durham Industries, Inc. v.
Tomy Corp.,
630 F.2d 905,
912 (2d Cir. 1980). It is not therefore
the idea of a couple with eight small puppies
seated on a
bench that is protected, but rather Roger's
expression
of this
idea — as caught in the placement, in
the particular light, and
in the expressions of the subjects — that
gives the photograph
its charming and unique character, that is to
say, makes
it original and copyrightable.
[33] Thus,
had appellant simply used the idea
presented by the photo,
there would not have been infringing copying.
But here Koons
used the identical expression of the idea that
Rogers created;
the composition, the poses, and the expressions
were all incorporated
into the sculpture to the extent that, under
the ordinary
observer test, we conclude that no reasonable
jury could have
differed on the issue of substantial similarity.
For this reason,
the district court properly held that Koons
"copied" the original.
[34] Moreover,
no copier may defend the act of plagiarism by
pointing out
how much of the copy he has not pirated. See
Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49,
56 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J.), cert.
denied,
298 U.S. 669, 56 S.Ct. 835, 80
L.Ed. 1392 (1936). Thus, where substantial similarity
is found,
small changes here and there made by the copier
are unavailing.
It is only where the points of dissimilarity
exceed those
that are similar and those similar are —
when compared to the
original work — of small import quantitatively
or qualitatively
that a finding of no infringement is appropriate.
See
3 Nimmer § 13.03[B][1][a]. This is not
the case here. Koons'
additions, such as the flowers in the hair of
the couple and
the bulbous noses of the puppies, are insufficient
to raise a genuine
issue of material fact with regard to copying
in light of the
overwhelming similarity to the protected expression
of the original
work.
[35] Because
of Koons' extensive use of the same expression
of the idea
that Rogers' created, it was properly held that
he "copied" the
protected features of the original. No genuine
issue of material
fact exists with respect to this finding; "String
of Puppies"
was copied from the photograph "Puppies" based
either on the
direct evidence of copying or on proof of access
and substantial
similarity. In light of this summary judgment
was properly
granted on this issue.
[36] III The
Fair Use Doctrine
[37] Defendant
Koons further defends his use of Rogers' work
"Puppies"
to craft "String of Puppies" under a claim of
a privilege
of "fair use." This equitable doctrine permits
other people
to use copyrighted material without the owner's
consent in a
reasonable manner for certain purposes. Codified
in § 107 of the
1976 Copyright Act, it is of ancient lineage.
Section 107 states
that an original work copied for purposes such
as criticism
or comment may not constitute infringement,
but instead may
be a fair use. The section provides an illustrative
— but not exhaustive
— list of factors for determining when
a use is "fair."
These factors include (1) the purpose and character
of the
use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work,
(3) the amount and
substantiality of the work used, and (4) the
effect of the use
on the market value of the original. 17
U.S.C. § 107.
[38] The fact
that the test envisioned by the Act is dependent
on the
circumstances of each case, see
3 Nimmer, § 13.05[A], might suggest
summary judgment is unavailable when
fair use is the issue, but such relief may be
granted when appropriate.
See
e.g., Stewart v. Abend,
495 U.S. 207,
110 S.Ct. 1750,
109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (summary judgment granted
upon finding of
no fair use). The trial court found no genuine
issues of fact present
regarding the fair use exception and granted
summary judgment
to plaintiff on this issue also. We proceed
therefore to analyze
the fair use factors in the circumstances of
the case at hand.
Our examination of these factors leads us to
conclude that the
district court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of plaintiff.
[39] 1. Purpose
and Character of the Use
[40] The first
factor, purpose and character of the use, asks
whether the
original was copied in good faith to benefit
the public
or primarily for the commercial interests of
the infringer.
See
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d 180,
182 (2d Cir.
1981). Knowing exploitation of a copyrighted
work for personal
gain militates against a finding of fair use.
And — because
it is an equitable doctrine — wrongful
denial of exploitative
conduct towards the work of another may bar
an otherwise
legitimate fair use claim. See
3 Nimmer, § 13.05[A][1].
Relevant to this issue is Koons' conduct, especially
his action
in tearing the copyright mark off of a Rogers
notecard prior
to sending it to the Italian artisans. This
action suggests bad
faith in defendant's use of plaintiff's work,
and militates against
a finding of fair use.
[41] The Supreme
Court has held that copies made for commercial
or profit-making
purposes are presumptively unfair. See
Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417,
449, 104
S.Ct. 774, 792, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). The Court
explained in a
subsequent case that the "crux of the profit/nonprofit
distinction
is not whether the sole motive of the use is
monetary gain
but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation
of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary
price." Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
471 U.S. 539,
562, 105 S.Ct.
2218, 2231, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985). We have
stated that,
though it is a significant factor, whether the
profit element
of the fair use calculus affects the ultimate
determination
of whether there is a fair use depends on the
totality of
the factors considered; it is not itself controlling.
See
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell,
803 F.2d 1253,
1262 (2d Cir.
1986), cert.
denied,
481 U.S. 1059, 107 S.Ct. 2201, 95 L.Ed.2d
856 (1987). Thus, while we note that Koons'
substantial profit
from his intentionally exploitive use of Rogers'
work also militates
against the finding of fair use, we turn next
to consider
his contention that the primary purpose of the
use was for
social comment.
[42] Parody
or Satire as Fair Use:
The Act expressly provides that comment
on or criticism of a copyrighted work may be
a valid use under
the fair use doctrine. We must analyze therefore
whether "String
of Puppies" is properly considered a comment
on or criticism
of the photograph "Puppies." Koons argues that
his sculpture
is a satire or parody of society at large. He
insists that
"String of Puppies" is a fair social criticism
and asserts to
support that proposition that he belongs to
the school of American
artists who believe the mass production of commodities
and media
images has caused a deterioration in the quality
of society,
and this artistic tradition of which he is a
member proposes
through incorporating these images into works
of art to comment
critically both on the incorporated object and
the political
and economic system that created it. These themes,
Koons states,
draw upon the artistic movements of Cubism and
Dadaism, with
particular influence attributed to Marcel Duchamp,
who in 1913
became the first to incorporate manufactured
objects (readymades)
into a work of art, directly influencing Koons'
work and
the work of other contemporary American artists.
We accept this
definition of the objective of this group of
American artists.
[43] To analyze
Koons' parody defense, we must first define
it. Parody
or satire, as we understand it, is when one
artist, for comic
effect or social commentary, closely imitates
the style of another
artist and in so doing creates a new art work
that makes ridiculous
the style and expression of
the original. Under our cases parody and satire
are valued forms of criticism,
encouraged because this sort of criticism itself
fosters the creativity
protected by the copyright law. See
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., Inc.,
720 F.2d 231,
242 (2d Cir.
1983). We have consistently held that a parody
entitles its creator
under the fair use doctrine to more extensive
use of the copied
work than is ordinarily allowed under the substantial
similarity
test. See
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting
Co.,
623 F.2d 252,
253 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
[44] Hence,
it must first be determined whether "String
of Puppies" is
a parody of Rogers' work for purposes of the
fair use doctrine.
We agree with the district court that it is
not. It is the
rule in this Circuit that though the satire
need not be only of
the copied work and may, as appellants urge
of "String of Puppies,"
also be a parody of modern society, the copied
work must
be, at least in part, an object of the parody,
otherwise there
would be no need to conjure up the original
work. See
MCA, Inc.
v. Wilson,
677 F.2d at 185; 3 Nimmer, § 13.05[C] n.
60.9.
[45] We think
this is a necessary rule, as were it otherwise
there would
be no real limitation on the copier's use of
another's copyrighted
work to make a statement on some aspect of society
at large.
If an infringement of copyrightable expression
could be justified
as fair use solely on the basis of the infringer's
claim to a
higher or different artistic use — without
insuring public
awareness of the original work there would be
no practicable
boundary to the fair use defense. Koons' claim
that his
infringement of Rogers' work is fair use solely
because he is acting
within an artistic tradition of commenting upon
the commonplace
thus cannot be accepted. The rule's function
is to insure
that credit is given where credit is due. By
requiring that
the copied work be an object of the parody,
we merely insist that
the audience be aware that underlying the parody
there is an original
and separate expression, attributable to a different
artist. This
awareness may come from the fact that the copied
work is publicly
known or because its existence is in some manner
acknowledged
by the parodist in connection with the parody.
Of course,
while our view of this matter does not necessarily
prevent Koons'
expression, although it may, it does recognize
that any such
exploitation must at least entail "paying the
customary
price." Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc.,
471 U.S. at 562,
105 S.Ct. at 2231.
[46] The problem
in the instant case is that even given that
"String of
Puppies" is a satirical critique of our materialistic
society, it
is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph
"Puppies" itself.
We conclude therefore that this first factor
of the fair use
doctrine cuts against a finding of fair use.
The circumstances
of this case indicate that Koons' copying of
the photograph
"Puppies" was done in bad faith, primarily for
profit-making
motives, and did not constitute a parody of
the original
work.
[47] 2. Nature
of the Copyrighted Work
[48] The next
fair use factor asks what is the nature of the
work that
has been copied. Where the original work is
factual rather than
fictional the scope of fair use is broader.
See
New Era Publications,
Int'l. v. Carol Publishing Group,
904 F.2d 152,
157 (2d Cir.),
cert.
denied,
___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 297, 112 L.Ed.2d
251 (1990). Whether the original is creative,
imaginative,
or represents an investment of time in anticipation
of a financial
return also should be considered. MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson,
677 F.2d at 182. Here "Puppies" was a published
work of art.
As an original expression it has more in common
with fiction than
with works based on facts, such as, for example,
biographies or
telephone directories. Since "Puppies" was creative
and imaginative
and Rogers, who makes his living as a photographer,
hopes to gain
a financial return for his efforts with this
photograph,
this factor militates against a finding of fair
use.
[49] 3. Amount
and Substantiality of Work Used
[50] Where
the amount of copying exceeds permissible levels,
summary judgment
has been upheld.
Walt
Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,
581 F.2d 751,
758 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439
U.S. 1132, 99 S.Ct. 1054, 59 L.Ed.2d 94 (1979).
To a large degree,
this factor involves the same analysis as that
used when determining
if the copy is substantially similar to the
original. Sometimes
wholesale copying may be permitted, while in
other cases
taking even a small percentage of the original
work has been
held unfair use. See
Maxtone-Graham,
803 F.2d at 1263. "[W]hat
is relevant is the amount and substantiality
of the copyrighted
expression
that has been used, not the factual
content
of the material in the copyrighted works." Salinger
v. Random
House, Inc.,
811 F.2d 90,
97 (2d Cir.) (emphasis in original),
reh'g
denied,
818 F.2d 252,
cert.
denied,
484 U.S. 890, 108
S.Ct. 213, 98 L.Ed.2d 177 (1987). It is not
fair use when
more of the original is copied than necessary.
Even more critical
than the quantity is the qualitative degree
of the copying:
what degree of the essence of the original is
copied in relation
to its whole. Id.
at 98; see
also New Era Publications
Int'l.,
904 F.2d at 159.
[51] Appellants
claim that under a parody defense their use
of Rogers'
work did not exceed the level permitted under
the fair use
doctrine. As discussed previously, this Circuit
has traditionally
afforded parodists significant leeway with respect
to the extent
and nature of their copying. See
Elsmere,
623 F.2d
at 253, n. 1; Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,
329 F.2d 541,
545 (2d Cir.),
cert.
denied,
379 U.S. 822, 85 S.Ct. 46, 13 L.Ed.2d
33 (1964). Yet, even under such a defense there
are limitations
on what constitutes fair use. See
MCA v. Wilson, 677
F.2d at 185. Here, the essence of Rogers' photograph
was copied
nearly in
toto,
much more than would have been necessary
even if the
sculpture had been a parody of plaintiff's work.
In short,
it is not really the parody flag that appellants
are sailing
under, but rather the flag of piracy. Moreover,
because we
have already determined that "String of Puppies"
is not a parody
of Rogers' work, appellants cannot avail themselves
of this
heightened tolerance under a parody defense.
[52] Nor does
Sony
Corp. of America,
464 U.S. at 449-50, 104 S.Ct. at
792-93, bear the weight that appellants place
on it for the proposition
that even 100 percent copying does not preclude
a fair
use finding. Although correct as a general statement,
it applied
in Sony
to a narrow set of circumstances. Sony's
copying equipment
(Betamax VCRs) was used by members of the
public to
record television programs — the copyright
of which was owned
by plaintiffs. The question was whether Sony's
selling of the
copying equipment violated plaintiffs' rights
under the Copyright
Act. The Supreme Court said "no" because
"time-shifting"
for those watching a television program enlarges
the viewing
audience, and does not impair plaintiffs' commercial
right in the
value of the copyright. Hence, no basis existed
under the
Act upon which plaintiffs could hold Sony liable
for selling
VCR's to the general public. Id.
at 421, 104 S.Ct. at 778.
[53] Those
are not the facts found here. Instead, Koons'
copying of Rogers'
work was the essence of the photograph, and
designedly done
as the notes to the Italian artisans conclusively
reveal. Koons
went well beyond the factual subject matter
of the photograph
to incorporate the very expression of the work
created by
Rogers. We find that no reasonable jury could
conclude that Koons
did not exceed a permissible level of copying
under the fair
use doctrine.
[54] 4. Effect
of the Use on the Market Value of the Original
[55] The fourth
factor looks at the effect of the use on the
market value
of the original. The Supreme Court in Stewart,
495 U.S. 207,
110 S.Ct.
1750, 109 L.Ed.2d 184, stated that the fourth
factor "is
the `most important, and indeed, central fair
use factor.'"
Id.
at 238, 110 S.Ct. at 1769 (quoting 3 Nimmer
§ 13.05[A]);
see
also Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 566, 105 S.Ct. at 2233.
Under this factor a balance must be struck between
the benefit
gained by the copyright owner when the copying
is found an
unfair use and the benefit gained by the public
when the use is
held to be fair. The less adverse impact on
the owner, the less
public benefit
need be shown to sustain non-commercial fair
use. It is
plain that where a use has no demonstrable impact
on a copyright
owners' potential market, the use n |