[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGECONTAINED HEADNOTES AND HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THECOURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.]

Kathryn L. Barrett, Jonathan A. Olsoff, Jonathan M. Gutoff, Peter Weiss, David Cole, Center For Constitutional Rights, New York City, for plaintiff.

Lane & Mittendorf, New York City (Thomas A. Harnett, of counsel), Benjamin W. Bull, Phoenix, Ariz., Peggy Coleman, American Family Ass'n, Tupelo, Miss., Larry L. Crain, Ames, Southwort & Crain, Brentwood, Tenn., Joseph Secola, Law Offices
of Vincent McCarthy, New Milford, Conn., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM C. CONNER, District Judge:

Multimedia artist David Wojnarowicz brings this action to enjoin the publication of a pamphlet by defendants American Family Association ("AFA") and Donald E. Wildmon, Executive Director of AFA, and for damages based upon claims of copyright infringement, defamation, and violations

of the Lanham Act and the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act. During the week before trial, defendants moved to dismiss the action or transfer it to the District of Mississippi on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants and improper venue. At the commencement of the trial on June 25, 1990, the Court denied these motions in an oral ruling from the bench, reserving the right to file a supplemental written opinion.

The expedited non-jury trial merged the evidentiary hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction with the trial on the merits pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. Three witnesses testified at trial: plaintiff, defendant Wildmon and Philip Yenawine, an expert on contemporary art. Having heard and considered the evidence presented at trial, the Court granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction by an Opinion and Order dated June 28, 1990. Plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunction to halt defendants' distribution of the allegedly violative material, a mandatory injunction requiring defendants to correct their alleged misrepresentations and an award of money damages. Having reviewed the record and considered counsels' post-trial briefs, the Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to judgment for defendants' violation of New York's Artists' Authorship Rights Act, but plaintiff's claims for copyright infringement, violation of the Lanham Act and defamation must be dismissed. This opinion incorporates the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rules 52(a) and 65(d), Fed.R.Civ.P.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Defendant AFA, formerly known as the National Federation For Decency, was founded in 1977 as a not-for-profit corporation by Donald E. Wildmon. Incorporated under the laws of the state of Mississippi, and headquartered in Tupelo, Mississippi, the AFA has over 60,000 members and approximately 500 local chapters nationwide, including a number in the state of New York. It is chartered for the declared purposes, inter alia, of promoting decency in the American society and advancing the Judeo-Christian ethic in America. Defendant Donald E. Wildmon, Executive Director of the AFA, is a citizen of the United States, residing in Tupelo, Mississippi. Since May 1989, the AFA has been actively campaigning against what it characterizes as the subsidization of "offensive" and "blasphemous" art by the National Endowment for the Arts (the "NEA"). Through contributions, it raised $5.2 million dollars in 1989.

Plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, residing in New York, New York, is a multi-media artist, whose work includes paintings, photographs, collages, sculptures, installations, video tapes, films, essays and public performances. A professional artist, plaintiff earns his living by selling his art works, many of which are assertedly directed at bringing attention to the devastation wrought upon the homosexual community by the AIDS epidemic. Plaintiff attempts through his work to expose what he views as the failure of the United States government and public to confront the AIDS epidemic in any meaningful way. To this end, plaintiff's art at times incorporates sexually explicit images for the avowed purpose of shaping community attitudes towards sexuality. As a result, his works have been the subject of controversy and public debate concerning government funding of non-traditional art.

Plaintiff's art works frequently employ groupings of images which are assertedly intended to convey composite messages. The works have received a measure of critical acclaim and have been featured in a number of museum and gallery exhibitions. Plaintiff earned approximately $15,000 from the sale of his art works in 1988, approximately $34,000 in 1989 and $17,000 to date this year.

From January 23, 1990 through March 4, 1990, the University Galleries at Illinois State University, Normal, Illinois, presented a comprehensive exhibition of plaintiff's work, entitled "Tongues of Flame" (the "exhibit"), and published a 128-page catalog (the "catalog") which contained reproductions of over sixty of plaintiff's works, as well as essays by plaintiff and others.

The NEA awarded the University Galleries $15,000 to help pay for the exhibit and the catalog.

Plaintiff is the owner of the copyrights to all of the works displayed in the exhibit and of all of the reproductions of his work that appear in the catalog. The copyrights of the following works were duly registered by plaintiff in the United States Copyright Office on May 11, 1990:

ITSOFOMO Reg. No. 392,862 Rimbaud Series Reg. No. 392,863 Water Reg. No. 392,864 Delta Towels Reg. No. 392,865 Bad Moon Rising Reg. No. 392,866 Untitled (Genet) Reg. No. 392,867 Sex Series Reg. No. 392,868

On or about April 12, 1990, the AFA and Wildmon published and distributed throughout the United States, including the Southern District of New York, the AFA pamphlet (the "pamphlet") in an effort to stop public funding by the NEA of art works such as plaintiff's. The pamphlet was mailed to 523 members of Congress, 3,230 Christian leaders, 947 Christian radio stations and 1,578 newspapers, at least twenty-eight of which were located in this district. Without plaintiff's authorization, Wildmon photographically copied fourteen fragments of plaintiff's works which he believed most offensive to the public and reproduced these fragments in the AFA pamphlet. These fourteen images, with three exceptions, explicitly depict sexual acts. The other three images portray Christ with a hypodermic needle inserted in his arm, and two ambiguous scenes which plaintiff represents as respectively depicting an African purification ritual and two men dancing together.

Wildmon wrote the text of the pamphlet, which is entitled "Your Tax Dollars Helped Pay For These `Works of Art.'" It states in the introductory sentence that "the photographs appearing on this sheet were part of the David Wajnarowicz [sic] `Tongues of Flame' exhibit catalog." The envelope in which the AFA pamphlet was mailed states that the "[p]hotos enclosed in this envelope were taken from the catalog of the `Tongues of Flame' exhibit" and is marked "Caution — Contains Extremely Offensive Material."

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As stated in the Court's oral ruling from the bench at the start of the trial, jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332, 1338, 1391 and 1400 in light of defendants' publication and distribution of the AFA pamphlet in this district. Personal jurisdiction over defendants is proper under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules § 302(a)(2). Wildmon's claim that plaintiff has failed to state any claim against him personally, as distinguished from his capacity as Executive Director of the AFA, is rejected. Wildmon may be held personally liable because plaintiff has proved through the testimony of Wildmon himself that he was personally responsible for the alleged violations. See Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (defendant personally liable for infringement if he has "the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities"); Davidson v. Vohann of California, Inc., 1988 WL 96016, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9394 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1988) (defendant personally liable for infringement if "plaintiff proves that he personally participated in the infringement"); Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 456 F. Supp. 531, 537 (1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1978) ("An individual, including a corporate officer, director or stockholder, who causes a corporate defendant to infringe, or personally participates in the acts constituting the infringement is jointly and severally liable for the infringement.").

I. New York's Artists' Authorship Rights Act

New York's Artists' Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. Cultural Affairs Law Section 14.03 (McKinney's Supp. 1990), provides, in relevant part, that:

1. [N]o person other than the artist or a person acting with the artist's consent shall knowingly display in a place accessible to the public or publish a work of fine art or limited edition multiple of not more than three hundred copies by that artist or a reproduction thereof in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if the work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the work of the artist, or under circumstances which would reasonable be regarded as being the work of the artist, and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom. . . .

2. (b) The rights created by this subdivision shall exist in addition to any other rights and duties which may now or in the future be applicable.

3. (e) The provisions of this section shall apply only to works of fine art or limited edition multiples of not more than three hundred copies knowingly displayed in a place accessible to the public, published or reproduced in this state.

4. (a) An artist aggrieved under subdivision one or subdivision two of this section shall have a cause of action for legal and injunctive relief.

A. Preemption

Defendants first argue that this state claim is preempted by federal copyright law. Despite two Southern District cases which assertedly support the position of defendants, see Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N Y 1985), this Court rules that claims under the New York Artists' Authorship Rights law are not preempted by the federal Copyright Act.

To fall within the preemption provision of the federal copyright act, 17 U.S.C. § 301, "(1) the work in question must be within the subject matter of copyright as defined in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and (2) the state law created right must be equivalent to any exclusive copyright rights in 17 U.S.C. § 106." Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). If the state law provides different rights than are available under the federal law, it is not preempted. As stated in Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), "[t]he prevailing test may be referred to as the `extra element' test." That extra element must change not merely the scope of the action but its nature, so that the state law claim is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim. Where the state law violation is predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere copying, the action is qualitatively different and there is no preemption. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985). See, e.g., Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allegations of breach of contract as well as unauthorized reproduction precludes preemption); Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1052, 1063-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (allegations of unfair competition in addition to unauthorized reproduction precludes preemption).

Although the rights to reproduce and to produce derivative work are protected by the Copyright Act, section 14.03 of the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act as amended is indeed qualitatively different than federal copyright law in both its aim and its elements. The state Act endeavors to protect an artist's reputation from the attribution to him of altered, defaced, mutilated or modified works of art. See Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 1734, 1738-39 (1984) ("[I]t may be argued that there is a qualitative difference between New York and federal law, since the state statute aims at protecting the artist's reputation, a species of tort law traditionally reserved to the states."). Moreover, a claim under this statute requires proof of elements not required to prove copyright infringement, namely (a) the artwork must be altered, defaced, mutilated or modified; (b) the altered, defaced, mutilated or modified artwork must be attributed to the artist, or displayed in such circumstances as to be reasonably understood to be his work; and (c) this attribution must be reasonably likely to damage the artist's reputation. See Damich, A Comparative Critique, 84 Colum.L.Rev. at 1738 ("The right of attribution found in the . . . New York statute[] would appear sufficiently distinct to escape preemption."). While both plaintiff's state law and copyright claims are based upon the same cropped reproductions contained in the AFA pamphlet, they are qualitatively different and hence there is no preemption.

Defendants further argue for preemption under the United State's Constitution's Supremacy Clause, Article VI, claiming that the statute conflicts with the Copyright Act by prohibiting the exercise of certain rights expressly granted by the Copyright Act. Defendants offer the following two examples:

A direct conflict exists where the artist transfers his artwork together with the copyright to such other person (Mr. X). Mr. X creates a derivative work by altering the artwork and places it on display to the public as the work of the artist, damaging his reputation. The artist's rights under section 14.03 have been violated, yet Mr. X's actions are expressly authorized under the Copyright Act.

The same conflict occurs where the artist transfers his artwork to one person (Mr. Y) and the copyright to another (Mr. Z). Mr. Y may alter or modify the artwork and place it on display to the public as the work of the artist, damaging his reputation. Mr. Z may have no objection to this conduct. The artist, under the New York law, may restrain the conduct even though it is an exercise of a right expressly granted by the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.

Neither example supports defendants' position. The Court does not agree that the Copyright Act authorizes a copyright owner other than the creator to publish or display an altered work, attributing that altered work to the original creator, and defendants have cited no decisions to that effect. Accordingly, this Court concludes that New York's Artists' Authorship Rights Act does not conflict with the Copyright Act and is not preempted thereby under the Supremacy Clause.

B. Scope of Act

Defendants next argue that the distribution of a photocopy of cropped images extracted from plaintiff's work is not a violation of the statute because it did not alter, deface, mutilate or modify plaintiff's original work. This Court does not agree. A literal reading of section 14.03(1) of the Authorship Rights Act clearly demonstrates that the statute guards against alterations of reproductions as well as of the original works:

1. [N]o person . . . shall knowingly display in a place accessible to the public or publish a work of fine art . . . or a reproduction thereof in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if the work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the work of the artist.

See Damich, A Comparative Critique, 84 Colum.L.Rev. at 1740 ("A more plausible interpretation of the reproduction provision — and one supported by statutory language — is that unfaithful reproductions activate the protection of the statute if publicly displayed so as to damage the reputation of the author of the original."). Moreover, section 14.03(3)(b) of the Act confirms its applicability to altered reproductions of artworks in which no physical change has been made in the original work. That subsection — by which 14.03 is expressly limited —states that:

In the case of a reproduction, a change that is an ordinary result of the medium of reproduction does not by itself create a violation of subdivision one of this section or a right to disclaim authorship under subdivision two of this section.

Sections 14.03(1) and 14.03(3)(b), read together, suggest that deliberate alterations (such as selective cropping), as distinguished from those that ordinarily result from the reproduction process (such as reduction in overall size or loss of detail), would constitute violations. See Damich, A Comparative Critique, 84 Colum.L.Rev. at 1740.

Defendants maintain that the statute's legislative history supports their contention that the display or publication envisioned is the altered original or limited edition multiple by a subsequent owner. The New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Legislation submitted to the legislature in accordance with Assembly Rules, ddressed the purpose of the Act, stating:

JUSTIFICATION

When a work of fine art is sold in New York, the author loses all rights to that work. There are cases where a work has been altered, mutilated or defaced by the owner without consulting with the creator. This is happening with more frequency, or the fact of occurrence is becoming more publicized, as an increasing number of artworks are in the public eye through publications, art being in public places, and exhibitions. While many civil law countries, such as France, Germany and Italy recognize the artist's lasting attachment to the work, our federal government does not. Only one state, California, acknowledges an artist's authorship rights. American courts, thus far, have rarely ruled in favor of the artist stating in decisions that there is no guidance from state or federal laws (citations omitted).

This bill would give New York artists grounds to go into court to allow the courts to decide whether the artists' reputation has been damaged when a work is intentionally defaced or mutilated by the owner. It would remedy for New York what John Merryman, a legal scholar who has written comprehensively on the subject, calls an "unworthy and intolerable hiatus in our law."

Assembly Memorandum on Assembly Bill 5052-B. It is evident that the statute was intended to protect the integrity of the original artworks and the artist's limited edition multiples after they were sold or transferred to new owners. The statute prevents the new owner from displaying or publishing and attributing to the creator an altered version of that creator's work. However, nothing in the legislative history suggests that the New York legislature intended to limit the Act's protection to that scenario. To the contrary, because the intent of the bill was to protect not only the integrity of the artwork, but the reputation of the artist, the spirit of the statute is best served by prohibiting the attribution to an artist of a published or publicly displayed altered reproduction of his original artwork. From a photographic reproduction, it cannot be seen whether the alteration was effected on the original or the copy, and both may cause the same harm to the artist's reputation when the altered version is published with attribution to him. In fact, the mass mailing of an altered photographic reproduction is likely to reach a far greater audience and cause greater harm to the artist than the display of an altered original, which may reach only a limited audience. While this situation may not have been expressly contemplated by the drafters the wording of the statute literally covers it, and the spirit of the statute would be contravened by it.

Second, this Court rejects defendants' claim that the reproduction and publication of minor, unrepresentative segments of larger works, printed wholly without context, does not constitute an alteration, defacement, mutilation or modification of plaintiff's artworks. By excising and reproducing only small portions of plaintiff's work, defendants have largely reduced plaintiff's multi-imaged works of art to solely sexual images, devoid of any political and artistic context. Extracting fragmentary images from complex, multi-imaged collages clearly alters and modifies such work.

Defendants also contend that their reproductions are not within the scope of the Act because the pamphlet was not publicly displayed or published. The Court finds this contention disingenuous. In the Copyright Act, the definition of "publication" is:

the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance or display, constitutes publication. . . .

17 U.S.C. § 101. By mailing over 200 pamphlets into the state of New York, thereby transferring ownership, to, among others, entities which it obviously intended to disseminate the pamphlet further, defendants have "published" their reproductions within the meaning of the Copyright Act's definition. Moreover, the Copyright Act provides that to "perform or display a work `publicly'" means:

(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of the normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.

17 U.S.C. § 101. Clearly, defendants communicated by means of a mailing, a form of public display. As the Court explained in previously rejecting defendants' argument after the trial, defendants' communication was not private merely because the pamphlet was mailed to selected individuals at specific locations rather than being exhibited in a museum. Defendants' communication is a public message urging opposition to NEA funding of such art. Because they sought to gain support for their cause through such a massive mailing, they can not now claim that there was no publication or public display.

Defendants next claim that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the alteration, modification, defacement or mutilation has caused or is reasonably likely to result in damage to his reputation. Defendants urge that plaintiff's reputation has not been diminished in the eyes of his peers or gallery directors, dealers and potential buyers who determine his livelihood but, to the contrary, the increased exposure and publicity has enhanced his reputation. However, the trial testimony of Philip Yenawine, an expert on contemporary art, employed by the Modern Museum of Art in New York, established that there is a reasonable likelihood that defendants' actions have jeopardized the monetary value of plaintiff's works and impaired plaintiff's professional and personal reputation.

Yenawine testified that because the details in the pamphlet imply that plaintiff's work consists primarily of explicit images of homosexual sex activity, plaintiff's name will be "anathema" to museums. Museums unfamiliar with plaintiff's work, believing the pamphlet to be representative of his work, may fail to review his work, even though many of plaintiff's art works do not contain sexual images. Even museums familiar with plaintiff's work may be reluctant to show his work due to his perceived association with pornography.

Yenawine stated that this self-censorship will have an adverse impact on the value of plaintiff's work; individuals will be less likely to purchase plaintiff's art without the pedigree of museum shows and accompanying reviews. Similarly, defendants' misrepresentation of plaintiff's work may deter persons from attending his shows, which may, in turn, reduce the incentive for galleries and museums to include plaintiff's work in future shows. Additionally, the public may associate plaintiff with only the sexually explicit images which were taken out of his intended political and artistic context, resulting in a reasonable likelihood of harm to his reputation and to the market for his work. Yenawine further testified that although corporations would not have been likely to purchase those works of plaintiff's which contain sexual images, "a great number of [plaintiff's] images . . . have no sexual representations whatsoever and deal with all sorts of other kinds of images. . . ."

When comparing the situation of plaintiff with that of either Robert Mapplethorpe or Andre Serrano, whose works have risen in value despite similar controversies, Yenawine testified that the works of Mapplethorpe and Serrano were presented in their entirety so that viewers could judge for themselves the merit of the works, unlike the works of plaintiff which were presented in fragments so that readers of the pamphlet could not fairly judge his works. Yenawine also noted that the reputations of both Mapplethorpe and Serrano were better able to withstand the outcry concerning their work because the controversies arose when, unlike plaintiff, they were well-established as artists and supported by investors who had substantial interest in protecting the value of their investments.

Defendants next assert that where the speech involves matters of public concern allegedly injuring the reputation of a public figure, actual malice must be proven to defeat First Amendment protection. While agreeing with the quotations submitted by defendants eloquently extolling the virtues of the First Amendment, this Court cannot agree that the alteration, defacement, mutilation or modification of artwork is protected speech, entitling defendants to immunity where they acted without actual malice. Clearly, the pamphlet contained protectable speech, namely, the protest against the subsidy of "obscene" art, which is entitled to the utmost First Amendment protection as the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes deserved by the people." See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The public display of an altered artwork, falsely attributed to the original artist, however, is not the type of speech or activity that demands protection, because such deception serves no socially useful purpose. The New York Statute does not impede truthful speech, but rather prevents false attribution, requiring only accurate labeling to permit dissemination of the desired message. Such labeling in no way diminishes the force of the message. Defendants remain free to criticize and condemn plaintiff's work if they so choose. They may present incomplete reproductions labeled as such or, alternatively, without attribution of such images to plaintiff. However, they may not present as complete works by plaintiff, selectively cropped versions of his originals.

Defendants also charge that the statute is unconstitutional (1) as applied, (2) on its face and (3) under the New York State Constitution. For the following reasons, the Court cannot agree. As stated above, the Artists' Authorship Rig`ts Act does not address a category of speech which is presumptively protected under the First Amendment. The First Amendment does not protect the public display of altered artwork, falsely attributed to the original artist. The public display of an altered reproduction for the purpose of expressing a grievance against the government or simply for the purpose of denouncing a social attitude in which there is no express or reasonably implied attribution to the original artist is altogether unlike the public attribution of an altered reproduction of a work of art to its original artist. While the former is protected speech, the latter is not. Accordingly, the First Amendment does not foreclose application of this statute to defendants' pamphlet. Similarly, narrowly tailored injunctive relief preventing only the false attribution to plaintiff of altered reproductions of his work does not constitute an unlawful prior restraint of protected speech.

As to defendants' position that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the Court again cannot agree. As explained above, the statute encompasses altered reproductions as well as altered originals and altered limited edition multiples. The statute is not impermissibly vague merely because it requires a determination as to whether damage to an artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result from an alteration and attribution. Defendants cite Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971), in support of the proposition that a law that turns on the reactions of onlookers is inherently vague. However, that decision is not apposite here. In that case, the ordinance which the Supreme Court ruled impermissibly vague made it a criminal offense for "three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the sidewalks . . and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. . . ." In looking to the construction given by the state court, the Supreme Court stated that the state court did not indicate upon whose sensitivity a violation depended — the sensitivity of the judge, the jury, the arresting officer, or a hypothetical reasonable man. Id. at 613, 91 S.Ct. at 1687. The Court noted that because no standard of conduct was specified in the statute, "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Id. at 614, 91 S.Ct. at 1688. Because the statute presently before the Court states that damage to the artist's reputation must be "reasonably likely" to result, the test is clearly whether a reasonable person would conclude that damage to the artist's reputation is likely. The Coates Court, moreover, found in the Ohio prohibition a blatant invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those whose association is "annoying" based on factors unrelated to their sidewalk activity. Id. at 616, 91 S.Ct. at 1689. The present facts raise no such threat of discrimination.

Nor is the statute overly broad. As discussed above, because the statute proscribes only the false attribution to an artist of an altered original, limited edition or reproduction of his work, it does not sweep within its ban speech which is protected by the First Amendment. Nor does it prohibit conduct specifically protected by federal copyright laws, as explained above under the preemption section. By requiring that a plaintiff prove a public showing of an altered version of his work, attributed to him, with a resulting reasonable likelihood of harm to his reputation, the Artists' Authorship Rights Act is sufficiently narrow to meet its aim of protecting artists' reputations as well as the integrity of the artwork for the benefit of both artists and the viewing public.

By attributing the modified images contained in the pamphlet to plaintiff as his works of art, defendants have created a likelihood of damage to his reputation as a serious artist and to his earning potential, and have thereby violated New York's Artists' Authorship Rights Act.

II. Violation of the Lanham Act

After reviewing counsels' pre-trial briefs concerning plaintiff's claim for false designation of origin, in an order announced orally from the bench at the commencement of the trial, the Court dismissed plaintiff's Lanham Act claim:

So in this situation where the defendants are not selling a product, and certainly not distributing a product in competition with plaintiff, and make no representations except as to the plaintiff's product or art works, Section 43(a) is not applicable.

Until 1988, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act covered only misrepresentations concerning one's own product, and did not apply to disparagement of a competitor's product. See Fur Information and Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme and Son, Inc., 501 F.2d 1048, 1051-52, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022, 95 S.Ct. 498, 42 L.Ed.2d 296 (1974). However, the Act was amended in 1988 to cover such disparagement. As amended, section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (West Supp. 1990), provides, in relevant part:

Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or service, uses in commerce . . . any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which —

(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the . . . origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or

(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such act.

Characterized as a remedial statute that should be broadly construed, section 43(a) has been successfully used to combat a wide variety of deceptive commercial practices. See PPX Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 1984). Its purpose is "the protection of consumers and competitors from a myriad of misrepresentations of products and services in commerce." Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Notwithstanding that the Act encompasses a broad range of misrepresentations, it is clearly directed only against false representations in connection with the sale of goods or services in interstate commerce. It has never been applied to stifle criticism of the goods or services of another by one, such as a consumer advocate, who is not engaged in marketing or promoting a competitive product or service. Indeed, the legislative history of the amendment crystallizes the coverage of section 43(a):

Under this proposed change only false or misleading "advertising or promotion" would be actionable, whether it pertained to the advertiser itself or another party. The change would exclude all other misrepresentations from section 43(a) coverage. These others are the type which raise free speech concerns, such as a Consumer Report which reviews and may disparage the quality . . . of products, [and] misrepresentations made by interested groups which may arguably disparage a company and its products. . . .

[T]he proposed change in section 43(a) should not be read in any way to limit political speech, consumer or editorial comment, parodies, satires, or other constitutionally protected material. . . . The section is narrowly drafted to encompass only clearly false and misleading commercial speech.

S. 1883, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 1207, 1217 (April 13, 1989).

Every instance of the Lanham Act's far-reaching application has been to practices commercial in nature, involving imitation, misrepresentation, or misappropriation in connection with the sale of goods or services by the defendant. See, e.g., PPX Enterprises, Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) (marketing albums purporting to feature artist, but which did not contain such performances); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc., v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (misappropriating cheerleader uniform in sexually explicit film); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1979) (imitating trade dress of established, competitive punch);